Case details

Club waited hours before calling 911, decedent’s mom claimed

SUMMARY

$15000000

Amount

Verdict-Plaintiff

Result type

Not present

Ruling
KEYWORDS
arrhythmia, cardiac, death, pulmonary, respiratory
FACTS
On Sept. 3, 2017, plaintiff’s decedent William Keck III, 48, was playing paddle tennis in a tournament at the Bel-Air Bay Club, a private beach club in Pacific Palisades. It was a hot and humid day. At around 1:30 p.m., Keck entered the locker room, which was not air conditioned, and alerted a locker room attendant that he had cramping in his leg. Keck asked the attendant to massage his calf, but the cramps persisted and worsened over the next few hours even though the attendant continued to massage him. The cramping eventually spread, and Keck continued to sweat, despite receiving liquids. At 4:59 p.m., Keck started having difficulty breathing, so the club called 9-1-1. The paramedics arrived four minutes later. Keck’s skin was turning blue, and he soon lost consciousness. The paramedics attended to him at the scene before removing him via an ambulance. Keck arrived at a hospital within 15 minutes, but the hospital was unable to revive him. Keck was reported to have died at 5:56 p.m. Keck’s mother, Katherine Keck, acting individually and in behalf of her son’s estate, sued the operator of the club, Bel-Air Bay Club Ltd. The lawsuit alleged that the club’s employees were negligent in failing to timely get William Keck appropriate medical attention. The lawsuit also alleged that the club was negligent for failing to train all of its employees, perform drills with the employees, or have proper policies, procedures and lines of communication in place. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Keck was showing signs and symptoms of a heat-related illness when he entered the locker room, but that the attendants were not trained and did not know the symptoms of heat exhaustion or the procedures for what to do about it. Counsel contended that, though the attendants summoned the athletic director, the head of security and the lower club manager, all of whom were trained, those individuals did not follow their training. According to plaintiffs’ counsel, witness testimony disputed the club’s claim that the club employees repeatedly checked on Keck for nearly four hours and the claim that Keck was conscious and alert, as well as called into question whether Keck’s heat illness impaired his judgment. Plaintiff’s counsel noted that, though Keck never got up, his condition never improved and that several club members inquired as to what was wrong with Keck, but that the club’s employees stated that Keck was dehydrated. Plaintiff’s counsel contended that dehydration also requires medical attention, but that no one consulted with the doctor exercising next to the locker room or brought in the club lifeguard, who was also a trained emergency medical technician. Plaintiffs’ counsel noted that the athletic director finally called the lifeguard at approximately 4 p.m. and asked him to look at Keck, but that the lifeguard was unable to abandon his post at that time and said that if the director was concerned, to call 9-1-1. Counsel noted that 9-1-1 was not called until 4:59 p.m., when Keck started having trouble breathing. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the staff at the Bel-Air Bay Club owed a duty of care to Keck to recognize his symptoms and his worsening condition, and to get Keck medical attention sooner. Counsel contended that there were numerous red flags that Keck was suffering heat exhaustion and required medical attention. Plaintiff’s counsel also contended that since Keck showed signs and symptoms of heat illness or exhaustion, the club’s own policies, as well as the standard of care, required a timely call to 9-1-1 for heat-related illness, but that the club violated its own policies and procedures, as well as the standard of care, by not calling 9-1-1 for nearly four hours and not moving Keck to a cool place. Plaintiff’s counsel further contended that 9-1-1 should have been called no later than 30 minutes to an hour and that had 9-1-1 been called as late as 4 p.m., Keck would have survived. Defense counsel attempted to argue that the Bel-Air Bay Club was protected under California’s Good Samaritan statute. However, the club was not permitted to argue that status because the law does not allow Good Samaritan status to alter the pre-existing duty to call 9-1-1 and because the club’s employees were paid to call 9-1-1, which meant they were not Good Samaritans. Defense counsel contended that Keck was a competitive person and did not adequately hydrate himself during the tournament. Counsel also contended that Keck failed to take up offers to play shorter games or rest between sets and that Keck had overdone it playing before and should have known his limits. Counsel further contended that Keck had a habit of resting and sweating it out in the locker room and that, on the day of the subject incident, Keck was awake, coherent and joked with the head of security a few times. In addition, counsel contended that, for nearly four hours, the club’s employees checked on Keck, whom they claimed was conscious and alert, and provided Keck water and more massages. Defense counsel maintained that the club’s employees repeatedly offered Keck the option of calling 9-1-1, a doctor and/or a family member, but that Keck refused. Counsel also maintained that the employees loved Keck and that if they felt anything was remotely wrong with him, they would have called 9-1-1. In addition, counsel maintained that the first time anything looked like an emergency was at 4:59 p.m. and that the club’s employees immediately called 9-1-1 at that time. Defense counsel argued that the duty in California is simply to offer 9-1-1 help and that if the victim refuses it, then the entity offering help has met its duty. Counsel also argued that Keck was a stubborn person and that even if the club had called 9-1-1 earlier, Keck would not have consented to medical care form the paramedics, which defeated plaintiffs’ counsel’s theory of causation., Paramedics arrived within four minutes of the 9-1-1 call, but Keck lost consciousness shortly after they arrived. Although the paramedics rushed Keck to UCLA Medical Center, Santa Monica, within 15 minutes, the heat exhaustion caused Keck’s potassium to rise to dangerous levels, which caused him to go into arrhythmia shortly after arriving there. The hospital was unable to revive him, and Keck was declared dead as a result of the arrhythmia at 5:56 p.m. on Sept. 3, 2017. He was 48. Keck was a member of the Keck family, which was part of several Keck Foundations that were well known in California for their philanthropic support of schools, such as the Keck School of Medicine of the University of Southern California, the Public Broadcasting Service and other charities. Keck sat on several Keck Foundation boards and he was a member of the Bel-Air Bay Club, where his mother was also a member. Keck’s estate sought recovery of wrongful death damages. Defense counsel contended that Keck was not suffering heat exhaustion, but, rather, rhabdomyolysis, an exercise-based injury that is silent and undetectable, and that can cause a dangerous spike in potassium. Counsel also contended that Keck had an enlarged heart, which made his condition worse, and that the only sign of a potassium spike would have been cramping, which could easily be confused with an exercise-related injury. Defense counsel argued that nothing about Keck made it look like he was suffering anything other than being tired from exercise, as he was drinking Gatorade and had ice packs and water. Additionally, counsel argued that Keck had everything at his fingertips, including the ability to call 9-1-1, but that Keck turned it down. Defense counsel argued that the club did nothing wrong and that Keck was responsible for his own death. In response, plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the allegation of Keck’s condition being due to rhabdomyolysis was impeached by autopsy findings and the opinions of the estate’s internal medicine and pathology experts. Plaintiff’s counsel further argued that 9-1-1 is not medical care and that a 9-1-1 call does not need the consent of Keck. In addition, counsel argued that Keck was not suicidal and that if an ambulance showed up and told him that he needed medical care, then Keck would have accepted it.
COURT
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Santa Monica, CA

Recommended Experts

NEED HELP? TALK WITH AN EXPERT

Get a FREE consultation for your case