On Aug. 30, 2012, plaintiff Steve Franklin, 50, a data process manager in the California Department of Transportation’s information technology department, was terminated from his position. Franklin alleged that prior to his termination, he was subjected harassment; abuse; disparate treatment; retaliation; and discrimination on account of his medical condition, requests for family and medical leave, safety complaints, and Department of Fair Employment and Housing complaints. Franklin filed a Department of Fair Employment complaint, and he received an immediate right to sue notice on Jan. 17, 2013. Franklin sued his employer, California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). He alleged that Caltrans’ actions constituted discrimination and denial of protected medical leave in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act and California Family Rights Act, and retaliation under Government Code §12945.2. He also alleged that Caltrans’ actions constituted retaliation, hostile work environment, disability discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the interactive process under Government Code §12940. In addition, Franklin asserted a new theory of recovery (interference with requests for medical leave under the California Family Rights Act) upon close of his case-in-chief at trial, but the claim was subsequently dismissed by the plaintiff before the jury reached its verdict. Franklin denied he had any medical condition, other than back pain and workplace stress, since at least 2007, but in April 2011 and May 2011, he requested, and was granted, leave under the Family Medical Leave Act and California Family Rights Act so that he could allegedly care for his mother, who was dying. However, Franklin claimed that his supervisor, Carolyn Pennington, initially refused to grant him medical leave, threatened him and reported himabsent without official leave (AWOL) while he was out on family leave. Franklin also claimed that Pennington stopped or delayed payment of wages, and accused him of workplace violence. In addition, Franklin claimed that he was demoted after Pennington initiated an adverse employment action against him after the alleged workplace violence incident and that the State Personnel Board upheld the demotion. (Franklin failed to timely pursue further action.) Thus, plaintiff’s counsel argued that Caltrans’ adverse actions against Franklin were retaliatory and motivated by discriminatory intent. Defense counsel sought to exclude all evidence regarding Franklin’s allegations of illegal/improper demotion in 2011 or reduction of pay in 2008 (arising out of an earlier adverse action) on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run out and that Franklin had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Counsel also argued that Franklin was collaterally estopped from arguing that the pay reduction and demotion were improper. The court denied defense counsel’s adjudicative and in limine motions, and permitted presentation of the evidence at trial. Thus, defense counsel argued that Franklin was previously disciplined in 2008, in form of a pay reduction, and again in 2011, in the form of a demotion. Counsel also argued that Franklin’s employment was ultimately terminated because of poor work performance and insubordination. Defense counsel noted that medical records revealed that in November 2011 and December 2011, Franklin’s mental health deteriorated and that Franklin was referred to the psychology department at a Kaiser facility. Franklin was allegedly diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features, and Franklin was provided with a doctor’s note, excusing him from work through March 1, 2012. However, according to defense counsel, Franklin denied his diagnosis, refused treatment, and insisted on returning to work. As a result, Franklin’s doctor allegedly relented and returned Franklin to work, part time, four hours per day, effective Jan. 16, 2012. Defense counsel also contended that Franklin’s mother died on Jan. 15, 2012, yet Franklin tried to return to work on Jan. 17, 2012. However, defense counsel contended that upon Franklin’s return, Franklin was unable to work, failed to perform, and remained combative and accusatory with all of his supervisors. Defense counsel noted that from April 2012 to July 2012, Franklin’s supervisor, Anna Ching, meticulously recorded every single incident of Franklin’s alleged insubordination, tardiness, poor work performance, and bad behavior, ranging from the benign to the malign. Defense counsel contended that as a result, Ching began the disciplinary process for termination of employment, but at the same time, Franklin demanded leave from work for health problems and accused Caltrans of harassment and disparate treatment. Counsel also asserted that Franklin refused to fill out and return Family Medical Leave Act, workers’ compensation, leave of absence, or reasonable accommodation paperwork, but did provide doctor’s notes that excused him from work and limited his hours. Defense counsel asserted that Franklin was given sick leave from July 12, 2012 through July 29, 2012 and that preparation of the adverse action for termination of Franklin’s employment occurred contemporaneous with Franklin’s medical leave. Thus, on Aug. 17, 2012, Franklin was notified of termination of his employment, effective Aug. 30, 2012. In response, Franklin claimed that his supervisor required him to return to work on Jan. 17, 2012, two days after his mother passed, and subsequently forced him to work full time, contrary to the time restrictions imposed by his doctor. He also claimed that Caltrans knew or should have known that he suffered from a mental disability and that Caltrans should have accommodated his condition. However, defense counsel contended that even though Franklin claimed that Caltrans knew or should have known that Franklin had some sort of mental illness, Franklin denied having a bipolar disorder, having any mental illness, and, at various times, denied even being told by his doctor that he had bipolar disorder. In addition, defense counsel contended that Franklin claimed that all of his problems were from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by alleged bullying in the workplace. Thus, defense counsel argued that Caltrans never knew of Franklin’s diagnosis prior to his termination., Franklin alleged psychological and emotional resulting from years of defendant’s alleged abusive treatment at work by numerous supervisors and upper management. The alleged abuse was verbal, not physical. Plaintiff’s expert in psychology testified as an expert on workplace bullying, characteristics and patterns of bullying commonly found in the workplace, and the emotional impact bullying has on the victim. Plaintiff’s expert neuropsychologist testified that as a result of the abusive treatment in the workplace, Franklin suffered from PTSD and sustained permanent brain injury to the temporal lobe affecting his ability to learn. Plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology accused plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist of misdiagnosing Franklin with bipolar disorder. Plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology, based upon the neuropsychology tests he conducted on Franklin over the course of one day nearly five years after Franklin’s initial treatment with his treating psychiatrist, contended that there was no empirical evidence of bipolar disorder. Plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology discounted or ignored observations of bipolar symptoms noted by multiple treating physicians and clinicians. Instead, plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology testified that his neuropsychological testing was more accurate. Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and defense’s expert in neuropsychology both testified that Franklin suffered from bipolar disorder with psychotic features. Notably, Franklin suffers from persecutory delusions. Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and defense’s expert in neuropsychology further testified that with proper treatment (psychotherapy and mood stabilizing medications), Franklin should be able to function in social and occupational settings within three months. Plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology rejected the use of pharmacological treatment, instead arguing that the brain can best regulate itself with exercise. Therefore, plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology recommended physical exercise, special neuro-exercises three times a week for 10-15 years, and psychotherapy two times a week for five years, decreasing gradually to once a month for another 10 years. Plaintiff’s expert in neuropsychology testified that future treatment would cost $750,000. He further opined that Franklin would never be able to work again. Plaintiff’s economist testified that Franklin’s lost income and benefits over the remainder of his career totaled approximately $1.5 million. Plaintiff’s economist testified that if plaintiff is entitled to any recovery, it should only be for the time it would take him to find a new job and any reduction in retirement benefits (approximately $200,000). Franklin claimed that he suffered from psychological and emotional as a result of the years of abusive treatment at work by numerous supervisors and upper management at Caltrans. He alleged the abuse was verbal, not physical. The plaintiff’s psychology expert testified about workplace bullying, characteristics and patterns of bullying commonly found in the workplace, and the emotional impact bullying has on a victim. The plaintiff’s expert neuropsychologist testified that as a result of the abusive treatment in the workplace, Franklin suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and sustained a permanent brain injury to the temporal lobe, which affects Franklin’s ability to learn. The expert also accused the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist of misdiagnosing Franklin with bipolar disorder and opined that based upon the neuropsychology tests he conducted on Franklin, there was no empirical evidence of bipolar disorder. The plaintiff’s expert neuropsychologist also rejected the use of pharmacological treatment and, instead, argued that the brain can best regulate itself with exercise. Therefore, the expert recommended physical exercise, special neuro-exercises three times a week for 10 to 15 years, and psychotherapy two times a week for five years, decreasing gradually to once a month for another 10 years. In addition, the expert opined that Franklin’s future treatment would cost $750,000, but opined that Franklin would never be able to work again. The plaintiff’s expert economist opined that Franklin’s lost income and benefits over the remainder of his career totaled approximately $1.5 million. The expert also opined that if Franklin is entitled to any recovery, it should only be for the time it would take him to find a new job and any reduction in retirement benefits (which amounted to approximately $200,000). Defense counsel noted that the plaintiff’s previous treating psychiatrist agreed with the defense’s neuropsychology expert, in that Franklin suffered from a bipolar disorder with psychotic features. Notably, both experts opined that Franklin suffers from persecutory delusions. In addition, both the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and the defense’s neuropsychology expert opined that with proper treatment with psychotherapy and mood stabilizing medications, Franklin should be able to function in social and occupational settings within three months. Defense counsel disputed the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert neuropsychologist, noting that the plaintiff’s expert based his opinion upon the neuropsychology tests he conducted on Franklin over the course of one day, nearly five years after Franklin’s initial treatment with his treating psychiatrist. Defense counsel also noted that the plaintiff’s expert neuropsychologist discounted or ignored observations of bipolar symptoms noted by multiple treating physicians and clinicians, and, instead, testified that his neuropsychological testing was more accurate. Defense counsel further noted that the plaintiff’s neuropsychology expert relied only on the raw scores of his testing, ignoring the possibility of biased test validity and ignoring interpretative reports provided by the test publishers that demonstrated that Franklin suffered from persecutory delusions and perceptional defects. In addition, defense counsel asserted that the plaintiff’s expert ignored Franklin’s lifelong exposures to traumatic events and, significantly, insisted that Franklin should not receive pharmacological treatment. (Franklin had previously refused to take mood stabilizers prescribed by his treating doctor). Defense counsel argued that had Franklin been treated for PTSD, he would have been prescribed anti-depressants, which could have caused dangerous side effects, as anti-depressants can potentially trigger severe manic episodes with bipolar patients, which could result in risky behavior or suicide. Thus, defense counsel asserted that due to the side effects of anti-depressants, a competent medical professional will always rule out bipolar disorder before diagnosing a patient with PTSD. However, the plaintiff’s expert neuropsychologist disagreed that the medically accepted treatment of PTSD included the use of anti-depressants.