On May 12, 2009, the plaintiff, a 61-year-old family assistant at the Fresno County Head Start Program, Sharon, underwent surgery by Dr. Seung Nam Kim, an ob-gyn, to treat a pelvic organ prolapse at Fresno Surgical Hospital. The surgery consisted of a total vaginal hysterectomy, bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, anterior/posterior repair, Avulta anterior mesh placement, and perineoplasty. The surgery was uneventful, but the patient subsequently developed recurring urinary tract infections, which after a period of time, were thought to possibly be due to a mesh infection. On Oct. 5, 2009, Sharon collapsed at home and was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where she remained until Oct. 16, 2009. She then underwent surgery on Oct. 28, 2009, to treat the infected vaginal mesh and, during the course of the surgery, it was discovered that a retained foreign object, namely a 4×4 raytec surgical sponge, was located behind the mesh at the level of the bladder neck. The sponge was removed and Sharon was discharged from the hospital two days later. Sharon sued Kim and Fresno Surgical Hospital. She alleged Kim was failed to properly perform the initial pelvic organ prolapse surgery and that this failure constituted medical malpractice. She also alleged that the hospital was liable for Kim’s actions. Fresno Surgical Hospital ultimately agreed to a pretrial settlement. Thus, the matter proceeded to a trial against Kim only. The plaintiff’s ob-gyn expert testified that in a retained foreign object case, there is a “shared responsibility” between the surgeon and the hospital personnel, but that a surgeon has a non-delegable duty to remove foreign objects and that this cannot be delegated to any nursing personnel. The expert further testified that sponge counts are known to be incorrect and, therefore, should not be relied upon by the surgeon. Thus, he opined that before Kim placed the mesh in question, it was imperative that he conduct a thorough and careful visual and manual inspection of the area. The expert further opined that, had an inspection been done, it would have disclosed the presence of the retained sponge. Kim’s ob-gyn expert testified that surgical sponges can be, and often are, difficult to see and feel because once they become blood soaked, they take on the appearance of normal tissue and have the tactile sensation of normal tissue. Thus, the expert opined that even with a careful and reasonable wound examination, which a surgeon admittedly is required to do, such sponges cannot always be found. The defendant’s ob-gyn expert further testified that it is not realistic to say that where the sponge was found is where the sponge was located at the time the mesh was placed, and that most likely it was in a location that was not observable by the surgeon nor easy for him palpate. The expert opined that because of this, doctors necessarily have to rely upon the nurses to tell them whether the sponge count is or is not accurate. Kim’s counsel subsequently noted that the testimony of the nurses during the surgery, as well as the surgical record, indicated that the sponge count was reported as being correct, thereby affording Kim no opportunity for thinking otherwise. In addition, the defense’s expert nurse testified that an operating room nurse has the exclusive responsibility to accurately count sponges and that they do so not under the direction of the surgeon, but rather in accordance with the hospital’s protocol. The expert noted that while it’s true the surgeon can order additional sponge counts if it’s warranted, in the final analysis it is not the number of counts that is important, but the accuracy of the counting. Defense counsel contended that unfortunately in this case, it appears, at least in retrospect, that the nurses inaccurately counted the sponges and therefore issued a “false accurate account.”, Sharon claimed that she developed an infected vaginal mesh from the retained surgical sponge that was discovered during surgery. She subsequently required removal of the sponge and hospitalization. Sharon claimed that she has some physical residual problems, including urinary incontinence, which Kim’s original surgery was intended to correct. She also claimed that she suffers from emotional distress and depression from the ordeal, as well as chronic fatigue. Sharon alleged that as a result, she is now devoid of any enjoyment of life and is unable to do things that she very much enjoyed engaging in prior to the initial surgery. The plaintiff’s past medical expenses were paid by insurance. Thus, Sharon asked the jury to award $350,000 to $450,000 in damages for her past and future pain and suffering. Defense counsel argued that the plaintiff’s complaints were related to pre-existing conditions and, for the most part, were part of a normal recovery from the surgery she had undergone.