On Sept. 26, 2018, plaintiff Marissa Freeman, 20, a student at California State University, San Bernardino, attended the second session of a kinesiology class offered by the university in jogging, which was taught by Angel Castro, a university instructor. The assignment for the day was a timed "5k run" on a concrete and asphalt course, winding through the university, of approximately 5,000 meters, or approximately 3.1 miles. The class syllabus required students to complete all assignments as part of their grade. Approximately 75 students were divided into three groups, which were identified as "beginner," "intermediate" and "advanced" groups. There were approximately 30 novice runners, including Freeman, in the class, and participants were given discretion to run or walk as needed. Any students who could not complete the full course were to run, jog and/or walk 20 minutes out and 20 minutes back along the 5k course. The class began at 4 p.m. At that time, temperatures were approximately 95 degrees, according to the university’s weather station. The 5k run assignment began at approximately 4:30 p.m. Before 5:07 p.m., fellow students saw Freeman collapse to the ground just in front of Coussoulis Arena, the university’s basketball/volleyball stadium. She was non-responsive, her eyes were rolled back in her head, and she was gasping for air. University athletic department employees were present on the scene. One of those employees called the university’s certified athletic trainer, Pat Walsh, who arrived at the scene and had assessed Freeman as likely suffering a severe heat illness. As a result, a 9-1-1 call was made at 5:09 p.m. Firefighters and paramedics cared for Freeman from 5:24 p.m. until 5:45 p.m., when an American Medical Response ambulance arrived and transported Freeman to Dignity Health – Community Hospital of San Bernardino. Freeman arrived at the emergency room at 6:07 p.m., and she was assessed as suffering from possible heat stroke. At 7:27 p.m., Freeman suffered a two to four minute cardiac arrest but was successfully resuscitated. She was hospitalized until Nov. 1, 2018, when she was transferred to Reche Canyon Regional Rehabilitation Center, a skilled nursing facility in Colton. However, while at Reche Canyon, Freeman fell and suffered a potential head injury. Freeman, by and through her guardian ad litem, her father, sued Castro and the owner and operator of the university, the Board of Trustees of the California State University. Freeman’s father alleged that Castro was negligent for creating a dangerous condition and failing to properly supervise the students. He also alleged the board of trustees was negligent in its training of Castro and was vicariously liable for Castro’s actions. The board of trustees brought a third-party complaint against the employers of the responding firefighters and paramedics, the county of San Bernardino and the San Bernardino County Fire Protection District; the employer of the responding ambulance personnel, American Medical Response; the employer of the emergency room physician and staff that cared for Freeman, Dignity Health (doing business as the Community Hospital of San Bernardino); and the operator of Reche Canyon Regional Rehabilitation Center, Cambridge Sierra Holdings, LLC. The Board of Trustees alleged that the third-party defendants were negligent in their care of Freeman, causing her ultimate condition. Plaintiff’s counsel contended that Castro’s actions fell below the standard of care for a kinesiology instructor, as Castro directed the class, which included around 30 novice, un-acclimatized runners, such as Freeman, to do a timed 5k run/jog/walk under unsafe conditions. Counsel noted that Castro testified that he had in his mind a "cutoff" temperature for when it would be not safe to do the planned assignment and that the cutoff temperature was at or near 95 degrees Fahrenheit. However, plaintiff’s counsel asserted that even though temperatures were above the cutoff temperature Castro had in mind when the class began, Castro did not cancel or modify the activity. Counsel also asserted that Castro did not build in an acclimatization period for novice runners not used to working out in the heat and that there were no assigned rest or water breaks at specific intervals. Counsel further asserted that Castro did not use available safer locations, like available grassy fields or a nearby running track, and that Castro, instead, established a course on hot concrete and asphalt. In addition, plaintiff’s counsel contended that Castro had the class run on a route that led them out of the instructor’s direct line of sight, which left Castro unable to monitor the students’ progress, or watch for signs and symptoms of heat illness. Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that the university’s board of trustees failed to provide to its kinesiology instructors, including Castro, or its athletic department personnel the required heat illness prevention training under CAL-OSHA regulations, a systemwide 2007 policy from the California State University Chancellor’s Office, and a California State University, San Bernardino, 2016 Heat Illness Prevention Policy. Counsel asserted that this failure fell below the standard of care. Plaintiff’s counsel contended that the university’s certified athletic trainer, Walsh, left Freeman on the concrete, in the sun, and did not move Freeman to the air-conditioned indoor arena 20 feet away. According to the university employees, two 32-ounce water bottles were obtained and that Walsh sprayed the water on Freeman’s face and neck. However, plaintiff’s counsel asserted that despite having access to already-prepared coolers of ice water, ice machines and towels, Walsh did not begin the immediate, whole-body cooling measures that were recommended by his own professional association’s standards. Counsel added that when firefighters and paramedics testified that when they arrived at Freeman’s side at 5:24 p.m., no one was providing active cooling to Freeman. Thus, plaintiff’s counsel contended that the university’s personnel, including Walsh, failed to provide reasonable emergency care and first aid to Freeman after her collapse. Counsel contended that, instead, Freeman was left lying face down on a concrete surface in the sun that was determined to be approximately 110 to 117 degrees Fahrenheit and that the standards of a NATA-certified athletic trainer required applying rapid whole-body cooling via cold water immersion or covering the body in ice water soaked towels, and transporting the affected person indoors to a cool, air conditioned environment. Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that by failing to do this, despite having the knowledge and resources, Walsh fell below the standard of care. Defense counsel for the board of trustees and Castro contended that Castro’s use of a "self-paced activity," where students were told to go at their own pace, stop to rest, drink water, be in the shade whenever they needed to, and to not overexert themselves was reasonable. Counsel also contended that Freeman had a responsibility to know her own body and limits, and to act reasonably, but that Freeman overexerted herself during the run. Counsel noted that, out of the approximately 70 students in the class, no one had a problem with heat except Freeman. Thus, defense counsel asserted that the incident was a freak accident and unforeseeable and that the lack of other heat illnesses showed that it was safe. Defense counsel asserted that since the jogging class was an athletic activity with inherent dangers, primary assumption of risk applied and imposed a higher, recklessness standard to Castro’s conduct. Counsel also asserted that Walsh was not responsible for students other than those athletes assigned to him, that Walsh had no knowledge of what Freeman had suffered or what she had been doing, and that Walsh acted as a Good Samaritan, thus requiring proof of gross negligence to establish liability for Walsh’s actions. The board of trustees’ counsel contended that the employee heat-illness training was for outdoor workers, like custodians, landscapers and maintenance staff, and that the training was a discretionary decision by California State University, San Bernardino, and was not admissible, as course and scope of employment were admitted. Defense counsel for the board of trustees and Castro contended that the firefighters and paramedics of San Bernardino were grossly negligent in not providing treatment for heat stroke or any rapid cooling to Freeman between arriving at 5:24 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., when they turned over Freeman’s care to the ambulance. Counsel also contended that the ambulance personnel of American Medical Response were grossly negligent in going to the wrong location, which delayed their arrival, and for not providing any rapid whole-body cooling to Freeman for heat stroke. Defense counsel further contended that the emergency room doctor and staff at Community Hospital of San Bernardino failed to provide prompt rapid cooling to Freeman, and caused Freeman’s cardiac arrest by improperly administering a sedative, Versed, among other allegedly negligent errors. In addition, counsel contended that the staff at Reche Canyon Regional Rehabilitation Center was negligent in allowing Freeman to fall and hit her head, allegedly aggravating Freeman’s and damages via a concussion. Counsel for each of the third-party defendants contended that the care and treatment provided to Freeman was reasonable under the circumstances and that Freeman’s and damages were caused by the negligence of the university’s staff and the initial heat stroke event. In response, plaintiff’s counsel contended that primary assumption of risk did not apply to an all-levels academic jogging class, that the university’s first responders were not acting in a Good Samaritan capacity and that the standard of ordinary care would apply to all university conduct. On Oct. 26, 2020, court hearings began with COVID-19 precautions in place in a newly-created courtroom to accommodate proceedings of this size during the pandemic. Over the next three weeks, 105 motions in limine were heard. During the hearings, the court determined that comparative fault should be excluded, as no evidence of Freeman acting unreasonably was proffered and as the defense’s own kinesiology standard of care expert, Dr. Michael Ferrara, opined that Freeman acted reasonably. The court also determined that primary assumption of the risk did not apply as a matter of law. As a result, Ferrara’s opinions were excluded, since he based his opinions entirely on the recklessness standard applicable under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, and not on negligence. In addition, the Good Samaritan defense regarding Walsh’s conduct was excluded for failure to timely plead it, and for lack of supporting evidence or good cause for leave to amend., Freeman suffered severe heat stroke, multi-organ system failure, and an anoxic brain injury with metabolic encephalopathy. It was undisputed that the rendered Freeman unable to walk unaided, unable to speak in full sentences, unable to ever work or live independently, and in need of 24/7 home care and assistance. It was also undisputed that Freeman’s caused many other functional and cognitive impairments for the rest of her life. However, Freeman was able to be discharged to live in her family home environment. She was also able to feed herself with utensils, use a wheelchair, and communicate verbally and non-verbally with family and caregivers. Plaintiff’s counsel contended that Freeman’s and damages were caused by the university’s negligence prior to the arrival of the firefighters and paramedics at 5:24 p.m., and that the conduct of the third-party defendants was reasonable and not a substantial factor in causing Freeman’s and damages. Freeman sought recovery of $1,987,312.28 for her past medical costs, between $20,359,827 and $23,055,288 for her future medical care costs, and between $2,065,176 and $2,746,941 (present value) for her loss of earning capacity. She also sought recovery of damages for her past and future pain and suffering. Defense counsel for the university’s Board of Trustees and Castro contended that Freeman’s negligent overexertion was the cause of her . Defense counsel for each of the third-party defendants contended that all the harm resulting in Freeman and sequelae occurred before any of the third-party defendants’ medical or emergency personnel treated Freeman. Defense counsel disputed the reasonable value of Freeman’s alleged past medical expenses, and contended that the reasonable value of Freeman’s future medical care was between $3,786,044 and $10,633,003. In addition, counsel contended that any lost earnings were speculative, and suggested that Freeman be awarded award zero for lost earnings. During the court hearings, the defense’s causation expert, Dr. Vernon Williams, who would have testified regarding Freeman’s brain injury, was excluded because of a lack of foundation and because he conceded that any possible additional harm caused by the third-party defendants’ alleged negligence was unknowable. With no other admissible causation evidence, a nonsuit was granted as to the third-party complaint against each medical provider. Since the rulings reduced the number of parties in the case, the trial moved to a standard, large courtroom in the San Bernardino Civil Justice Center to begin jury selection. The court imposed COVID-19 safety protocols, as approved by the County of San Bernardino Department of Public Health. However, defense counsel challenged the appropriateness of the COVID-19 protocols, and raised due process concerns on proceeding forward via an emergency writ petition for a stay, and subsequently a petition to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on Nov. 24, 2020, and jury selection began on Nov. 30, 2020. Jury selection continued until Dec. 14, 2020, when proceedings were halted by the court due to rising COVID-19 infection rates and Intensive Care Unit capacity in the county falling to 0 percent. Jury selection was scheduled to resume on Feb. 16, 2021, but while the trial was halted, defense counsel filed a second writ petition challenging, among other things, due process validity of proceeding forward during COVID-19, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s rulings on the appropriate scope of voir dire, and the trial court’s granting of cause challenges.