On Dec. 14, 2010, plaintiff Monnie Wright, 60, a correctional officer at San Quentin State Prison, in San Quentin, was walking from his residence on the maximum security prison property to his job post. Wright was both an employee and tenant of the state of California. He rented the home on the San Quentin grounds with the state as his landlord. Wright was in his uniform at the time, wearing a utility belt, and was under a duty to assist if an inmate-related emergency arose on the prison grounds while he was on the property. As Wright descended the 80-year-old concrete stairway outside of his home, the second to last step collapsed under his foot, causing him to fall backward. Wright sustained to his back, a knee, and his right elbow. Wright initially filed a workers’ compensation claim and received benefits in the form of payments for his medical expenses and disability. However, in July 2012, he went out on early disability retirement. Thereafter, Wright filed a civil suit against the state, and the State of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Wright claimed that he was injured at his rental property and not at his place of employment. The state moved for summary judgment on the ground that workers’ compensation was Wright’s exclusive remedy. The state claimed that Wright was commuting at the time of his fall and that since Wright had already reached his employer’s premises (“premises rule”), the employment relationship had begun and Wright was covered by workers’ compensation. The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment, and applied the “premises line” test as an exception to the going-and-coming rule. Wright appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the court was incorrect in applying the “premises line” rule and claimed that, instead, the “bunkhouse rule” was the appropriate test for occurring in employer-owned housing. After a lengthy briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeal reversed the prior decision, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wright was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time he was injured. After getting the case back from the Court of Appeal, plaintiff’s counsel sought to establish that Wright was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time he was injured, which required establishing either that Wright’s did not arise out of his employment or that the did not occur in the course of his employment. Counsel also argued that the subject stairway constituted a dangerous condition. The state’s counsel denied that the stairway constituted a dangerous condition. Counsel contended that even if it was dangerous, Wright was negligent in causing his fall by failing to tell the state that the stairway was allegedly dangerous before the fall. The state’s counsel relied on a number of affirmative defenses under the government code and argued that the state had no notice of the dangerous condition. Counsel further contended that the state had a reasonable inspection system and that it had never identified the hazard. In addition, defense counsel argued that the state was not negligent because its maintenance and inspection practices were reasonable in light of its budgetary constraints and that Wright was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the fall, in that Wright was performing a task related to his state employment., Wright sustained an avulsion fracture of his right elbow, resulting in cubital tunnel syndrome. He also sustained tears of a knee’s medial meniscus, lateral meniscus, and anterior cruciate ligament. In addition, he claimed he suffered an inflammation of the L5-S1 nerve root. Wright subsequently underwent three knee surgeries to repair the ACL and meniscus, as well as surgery to repair the cubical tunnel nerve entrapment in the right elbow. Although he will not require any future surgery, Wright claimed that the to his back, elbow, and knee caused him to retire from his career as a correctional officer. He also claimed that his and inability to work caused him psychological distress. Defense counsel argued that Wright was exaggerating the extent of his residual and psychological distress and contended that Wright was able to work in other capacities with the state.