At around 9 a.m. on April 28, 2010, plaintiff Jack Tuttle, 50, a medical sales representative, slipped on the second floor landing of Ukiah Valley Medical Center, a medical complex in Ukiah. The medical complex was newly constructed 2.5 years before the accident, and Tuttle admitted to not using the handrail at the time of the incident. However, Tuttle claimed he fell down two flights of stairs and sustained to his ankle, knee, shoulder, elbow, and head. Tuttle sued the operator of Ukiah Valley Medical Center, Ukiah Adventist Hospital; the owner of the premises, Ukiah Valley Medical Plaza, L.P.; the general contractor who built the hospital, Crane of Ukiah Inc.; the architect, Selberg Associates Inc.; the tile subcontractors who installed tile at the medical center, Gary Peterson and Carol Peterson, individually and doing business as Peterson Tile; a tile manufacturer, Ceramic Tile World Inc.; and tile distribution companies, Dal-tile Distribution Inc. and Dal-tile Services Inc. Dal-tile Distribution and Dal-tile Services were ultimately dismissed from the case, and several other defendants settled out. Thus, the matter proceeded to trial against Ukiah Adventist Hospital only. Tuttle claimed that it rained for two days prior to and including the date of his fall and that the medical complex included an open atrium that allowed rain water to reach the landing and stairwell areas. He claimed that as a result, he slipped on water that had ponded on the tile at the top landing of the two-flight stairwell. Although Tuttle admitted that he never used handrails, he claimed the handrail was not extended sufficiently so that when he attempted to reach for the handrail after slipping, he was unsuccessful. Thus, he alleged the stairwell was defective due to level variations on the top landing, lack of water drainage, and code violations of the stairs themselves. At the commencement of trial, Ukiah Adventist Hospital admitted sole liability, and stipulated that neither Tuttle nor any other defendant was liable., Tuttle sustained fractures of a knee, a dislocation of a shoulder, a sprained ankle, and an elbow contusion. He was subsequently taken to the emergency room at Ukiah Valley Medical Center, located across the street from the accident location. There was no indication of a head injury in the E.R. medical record nor was a CT scan taken at that time. However, three days later, Tuttle complained of continued symptoms and was taken to the emergency room at Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital, in Santa Rosa, where an immediate CT of the head demonstrated a frontal lobe bleed. Subsequent treatment included two knee surgeries, two shoulder surgeries, and an arm surgery, as well as neuropsychological treatment for the head injury. Tuttle claimed that he was left with a residual limp and a deformity in walking stride. He also claimed he suffers limitations on bending, lifting and climbing, and has some impairment of memory, concentration, and executive function. Tuttle never returned to work. The plaintiff’s treating neurologist opined that Tuttle suffers from chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE). However, according to plaintiff’s counsel, Tuttle’s testimony at trial gave the jury the impression that Tuttle’s brain injury was minor. Tuttle sought recovery for his past and future medical expenses, past and future loss of earnings, and other past and future economic losses. He also sought recovery of damages for his past and future pain and suffering. Tuttle’s wife, Megan, sought recovery for her loss of consortium. Defense counsel denied Mr. Tuttle suffered any frontal lobe bleed, and the defense’s medical experts supported the claim that there was no head trauma or neurological impairment. Defense counsel contended that the plaintiff’s treating neurologist initially diagnosed Mr. Tuttle as suffer a post-traumatic personality disorder consistent with an injury to the frontal lobe of the brain, which should resolve overtime. However, defense counsel contended that without having any further visits with Mr. Tuttle, the plaintiff’s treating neurologist later changed his diagnosis from post-concussive syndrome to CTE based solely on a review of additional medical records and depositions provided to him by plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, defense counsel contended that the plaintiff’s treating neurologist’s opinions were based almost exclusively on Mr. Tuttle’s subjective complaints of ongoing cognitive impairment, including substantial impairment of executive functioning and vision loss. According to plaintiff’s counsel, Judge Arthur Wick allowed evidence to be admitted regarding details of similar head symptoms and arising from a rear-end crash 20 years earlier, including the 10 years it took to allegedly recover therefrom, despite Mr. Tuttle not complain of any symptoms during the 10 years before subject accident. This evidence allegedly diminished the testimony of the plaintiff’s treating neurologist’s diagnosis of CTE.