At approximately 9 p.m. on Friday, Aug. 31, 2012, plaintiff Joe Muskett, an attorney, was operating a rented Cadillac sedan with Nevada plates in the 400 block of Chapala Street, in Santa Barbara, when he was directed to a multi-jurisdictional sobriety checkpoint. The Muskett vehicle was occupied by his wife and three children, ages 29, 13 and 10. The family was en route to a rented vacation residence after an afternoon of sightseeing and having dinner in Santa Barbara. As the rented vehicle turned onto Chapala Street, it was directed into a multi-jurisdictional sobriety checkpoint. While waiting in line, someone was heard to say out loud, “Stop the Caddy with Nevada tags.” When Muskett’s turn came to enter the checkpoint, Officer David Lamar, of the Lompoc Police Department, approached the driver’s window, questioned Muskett and demanded his driver’s license, which Muskett handed over. Lamar then asked Muskett if he had consumed alcohol that night, to which Muskett responded that he had a beer with dinner at 6 p.m. As a result, Lamar directed Muskett out of the line of cars and ordered him to park the Cadillac at a designated location. Muskett complied. Lamar then proceeded to administer a field sobriety test. Muskett ultimately asked for a Preliminary Alcohol Screening (PAS) breath test so as to immediately resolve any suspicions that Lamar might have had that Muskett was violating the California law of driving under the influence of alcohol. Muskett burped in advance of the PAS and then had to waiting an additional 15 minutes to take the PAS while Lamar completed a Romberg field sobriety test, also known as a modified position of attention test, which was witnessed by Muskett’s adult daughter and wife. Muskett was ultimately cuffed and searched, as was his automobile. Lamar then transported Muskett to the Santa Barbara County jail and booked for alleged DUI. At 10:28 p.m., an employee of the Santa Barbara District Attorney’s office drew Muskett’s blood and booked it into evidence. The blood was forensically tested and it proved there was no measurable alcohol on board (i.e., Muskett’s blood alcohol content was measured as being 0.00). Muskett was eventually released without bail and was met by his wife, who had to employ a cab to take her children home and had to pay for the release of her husband and his vehicle. Muskett then hired criminal attorney to defend the charges against him and to obtain a declaration of factual innocence from the Santa Barbara Superior Court. However, even though Lamar allegedly contacted the Santa Barbara District Attorney, the attorney refused to file criminal charges against Muskett. In addition, Muskett came under suspicion of his employer, notwithstanding Muskett’s impeccable record, after he immediately reported the arrest to his employer, as required. However, an investigation was carried out (to the extent the Lompoc Police Department cooperated), and Muskett was cleared by his employer. Muskett sued Lamar and the officer’s employer, the city of Lompoc. Muskett alleged that the defendants’ actions constituted false arrest and imprisonment in violation of federal and state tort law. Specifically, Muskett brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal claim against Lamar, individually, and a Monell claim under the federal statute against the city. He also brought supplemental state law claims against the defendants, alleging false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Banes Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 52.1. Plaintiff’s counsel asserted that Lamar falsely detained and arrested Muskett during a sobriety checkpoint. Counsel contended that Muskett exhibited no scent or signs of intoxication as he spoke with Lamar and that Lamar lacked any basis to detain or examine Muskett. Counsel also contended that Muskett became suspicious of Lamar’s intentions based on Lamar’s persistence in light of the completed sobriety tests, which Muskett passed, and attempted to speak with his wife in order to make arrangements for transportation of his wife and their children from the scene. However, counsel asserted that Lamar presumably assumed Muskett was admitting guilt for being under the influence and informed Muskett that he was arresting him. Additionally, plaintiff’s counsel contended that Muskett’s wife was inexplicably forbidden to drive the Cadillac from the scene even though the request was made and nothing prohibited Lamar from turning the rental car over to Muskett’s wife, who was unquestionably Muskett’s spouse, licensed and fit to drive. Thus, counsel argued that this was further evidence of Lamar’s malice. Plaintiff’s counsel further argued that in order to justify his seizure of Muskett in the absence of probable cause to arrest, or reasonable suspicion to detain, Lamar wrote a crime-and-arrest report, in which Lamar falsified his claims of probable cause based on Muskett’s alleged objective symptoms, including an assertion that he tested Muskett for horizontal gaze nystagmus while Muskett was seated inside his car. Plaintiff’s counsel noted that everyone in the Muskett car refuted the claim that Lamar tested Muskett for horizontal gaze nystagmus, as well as refuted Lamar’s claim that Muskett’s eyes were bloodshot and watery. Moreover, Muskett’s daughter spoke up when Lamar claimed that Muskett had not kept up with the elapsed time count on the Romberg testing, and advised her father and Lamar that Lamar was being dishonest. Counsel further contended that Lamar created a report that contained fabrications, such as claiming that Muskett was swaying and burping in an attempt to defeat the PAS, in response to Muskett filing a complaint with the Lompoc Chief of Police, calling attention to Lamar’s alleged dishonesty and willful misrepresentations–each a crime themselves (Penal Code §§ 114 for false arrest, 118.1 for falsification of reports, 118 for perjury, and 270 for kidnapping). In addition, plaintiff’s counsel contended that the complaint investigation was given to the same sergeant who had approved Lamar’s crime-and-arrest report and that the manner in which the city and chief carried out the complaint investigation was consistent with the policy, practice and custom of the city and police department, in that they all refused to take any appropriate action against Lamar. Thus, plaintiff’s counsel argued that Lamar violated Muskett’s rights against unreasonable seizures secured to him by the 4th Amendment by fabricating probable cause to arrest him. Counsel also argued that, under the Monell claim, the manner in which Lamar deprived Muskett of his rights under the federal constitution was consistent with the city’s and police department’s customs, practices, and usages of turning a blind eye to unconstitutional misconduct. In addition, plaintiff’s counsel that the defendants’ actions of unreasonable seizure, incarceration without probable cause or with manufactured probable cause, and false imprisonment and arrest constituted violations of state law and the Banes Act. Defense counsel argued that Lamar is an exceptional police officer and that Lamar followed all proper protocol and legal requirements during the sobriety checkpoint and resulting arrest. Counsel contended that the Lompoc police chief performed a thorough internal investigation of Muskett’s complaint, but found that there was no evidence of any wrongdoing. Thus, defense counsel argued that the Lompoc police chief and sergeant likewise followed proper protocol and legal requirements when investigating the matter, including the citizen’s complaint filed by Muskett., Muskett is a resident of New Jersey and a former criminal prosecutor in the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s office, and is currently the national corporate counsel for Tropicana Entertainment. Plaintiff’s counsel contended that Muskett was cuffed in the presence of his children, who were emotionally distraught at what was happening to their father. Muskett’s 29-year-old daughter and wife attempted to mitigate the shame to Muskett by removing the small kids so as to not see their father as a prisoner. Muskett claimed that the handcuffs were so tight that they cut his wrists, leaving a permanent scar on his left wrist. He noted that he had never been arrested before and that his booking record (including his prints, photos, and criminal identification and information number assignment) was his first and only. However, he claimed that despite his success in the Superior Court petition for factual innocence, his record continues to exist as a “scarlet letter.” Thus, Muskett claimed that the existence of his booking record continues to be distressing and that it cannot be changed (Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 17 Cal.Rptr. 892), notwithstanding the successful petition.