At 4:30 a.m. on July 2, 2013, plaintiff Patricia Bryson, 70, a security guard and caregiver for her family, was driving on Interstate 15, in San Diego, heading home to Los Angeles with her husband, who was a passenger in her vehicle. When they were about a quarter mile north of Pala Mesa Drive, the left, rear-end of their 1993 Porsche was allegedly rear-ended by a furniture delivery truck operated by Raymundo Ruiz. Police arrived at the scene and cited Ruiz for violation of the California Vehicle Code § 22350 (for speeding). Bryson claimed to her head, back, neck, and right knee as a result of the collision. Bryson sued Ruiz, and Ruiz’s employer, VCSD Inc. Bryson alleged that Ruiz was negligent in the operation of the delivery truck. Bryson also alleged that VCSD was negligent in the hiring and retention of Ruiz, and was vicariously liable for Ruiz’s actions. Bryson claimed that she was driving approximately 65 mph on the freeway at the time of impact and that she did not see or hear Ruiz’s truck prior to the collision. Plaintiff’s counsel noted that Ruiz’s co-worker testified that he was half asleep, sitting next to Ruiz, when Ruiz allegedly yelled to him, “Wake up, we’re going to crash,” and that Ruiz then threw his arm out in front of the co-worker just before the collision. The co-worker further testified that he did not see the events that led up to the impact, but that he noted that the California Highway Patrol arrived and interviewed everyone, including Ruiz. He also noted that the paramedics arrived and attended to Bryson, and that the 20,000-pound truck had such damage to its front bumper that it had to be tied by a rope, whose other end was then tied to a tree, whereupon the driver backed the truck up in order to pull the bumper away from the right, front tire of the truck so that the truck could proceed on its delivery route. Bryson’s counsel asserted that VCSD negligently hired Ruiz without doing a proper background check on his driving records. Defense counsel presented evidence at trial that revealed that proper measures were undertaken to investigate Ruiz’s driving record and that before the subject incident, there was no evidence of any prior accidents or citations occurring prior to Ruiz’s employment with VCSD or thereafter. As a result, defense counsel moved for nonsuit as to Bryson’s negligent hiring and retention claim, and the motion was granted. However, VCSD stipulated that Ruiz was acting within the course and scope of his occupation at the time of the accident. Thus, the sole issue that went to the jury was whether Ruiz was negligent in the operation of his vehicle on the date of the incident. Defense counsel presented evidence that Bryson was wearing sunglasses at night and had spent the last nearly 16 hours gambling at a casino. Ruiz testified that he was driving on the freeway in the slow lane, traveling between 50 and 55 mph, when he saw Bryson’s vehicle swerve into his lane and then slow down. He claimed he tried to swerve to avoid colliding with her vehicle, but was unable to do so. The defense’s accident reconstruction expert opined that the speeds, as reported by Bryson, were incorrect and that Bryson was likely traveling at a speed of around 40 to 45 mph while on the freeway. The expert explained that, based on his analysis, there was an average speed differential of 10 mph between Ruiz’s truck and Bryson’s Porsche. He testified that although Bryson testified that she was traveling at 65 mph on the freeway, it could not have been possible because Ruiz’s truck was equipped with a governor that precluded his vehicle from traveling greater than 65 mph. Thus, the defense’s expert testified that based on Ruiz’s claim that he was traveling between 50 and 55 mph at the time of the incident, with the approximate 10 mile-per-hour differential, Bryson’s speed was more appropriately estimated at 40 to 45 mph at the time of the incident. Ruiz also denied all of his co-worker’s claims, including what incurred inside the truck prior to impact and the alleged damage to the truck. In addition, he denied ever speaking with any CHP officer, and claimed he did not remember even seeing one at the scene. In response, plaintiff’s counsel called the responding police officer to testify. The officer read from his report, attributing a specific statement to Ruiz and even put quotation marks around the words that Ruiz allegedly used at the scene., Bryson claimed that she sustained a torn meniscus to her right knee, and strains to her neck and back as a result of being shaken inside her vehicle. She was subsequently transported by ambulance to a hospital, along with her husband. At the hospital, Bryson was noted to have a contusion on her right knee, along with pain to the back and neck. She was then discharged a few hours later. About a week after the accident, Bryson followed up with a chiropractor, who was referred to her by her counsel, and underwent five months of chiropractic treatment for her neck, back, and knee issues. Later that year, in November 2013, Bryson was diagnosed with a meniscus tear in her right knee, which she attributed to the incident. As a result, she treated her knee with an expert orthopedic surgeon and ultimately underwent arthroscopic knee surgery on her right knee in August 2014. Thereafter, she was referred to a pain management expert and consulted with him in July, August, and September of 2016. During his treatment of Bryson, the treating pain management expert provided her with one injection of Synvisc-One (which supplements the fluid in a knee to help lubricate and cushion the joint) to her right knee in August 2016. Ultimately, in January 2017, Bryson underwent a total, right knee replacement. The plaintiff’s treating physicians, who were retained as experts, opined that Bryson’s complaints and treatment were the result of the accident exacerbating her pre-existing degenerative conditions. The plaintiff’s expert chiropractor was also testified about the reasonableness of Bryson’s chiropractic treatment, and respective costs, during the immediate post-incident months. Bryson claimed she could no longer work full-time as a security guard, or take care of herself and her family members, as she was limited in her ability to get around and for how long she could stand. She also claimed she had to move to a new house, as her old house had stairs that she could no longer easily ascend. Bryson testified that she was asymptomatic before the accident and that she had never reported or been noted to have had any swelling or pain above a two out of 10 to any physician regarding her then 70-year-old knee. She also testified that she never had any treatment to her right knee, which showed a posterior meniscus horn tear after the accident, and that her earlier accidents had been more than 20 years before the subject collision. Thus, Bryson sought recovery of $1.5 million in total damages, based on her estimate that she would continue to live for approximately another 20 years. Defense counsel contended that according to medical records, Bryson had arthritis and degenerative conditions in her right knee and back prior to the accident, which caused pain to her neck and back. Counsel pointed to a record that pre-dated the incident by one week in which Bryson complained of pain in her knee and for which she had an X-ray. Counsel also contended that notwithstanding Bryson’s claims that she could not work after the incident, her employment records showed that she continued to work full time (eight-hour days) for at least four months after the incident. Thus, defense counsel impeached Bryson’s pain management doctor on that issue, where the expert had relied on Bryson’s statements to him that she could not work after the incident. Additionally, defense counsel noted that none of the imaging studies taken in the emergency room demonstrated any broken bones or traumatic resulting from the incident. Thus, counsel argued that Bryson’s meniscus tear was not traumatic nor did it result from the accident, but, rather, was the result of Bryson’s degenerative issues. The defense accident reconstruction expert briefly touched on kinematics, opining that the force of the vehicle and impact was inconsistent with the to the knee and head, as alleged by Bryson. The defense’s orthopedic expert also opined that Bryson’s alleged , arthroscopy, and knee replacement were the result of Bryson’s pre-existing, degenerative conditions, rather than the result of the accident. Thus, defense counsel argued that Bryson was not entitled to any award.