On Jan. 23, 2012, plaintiff Steven Percelle, an inmate, was transferred from general population at the Correctional Training Facility, in Soledad, to the segregated housing unit after he was deemed to be a member of a prison gang. Percelle was first incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility on Aug. 20, 2003. For the first seven years of his sentence, he was on “A1A” status, meaning he was not in trouble, and was earning good-time and work-time credits. On May 16, 2005, Percelle filed suit in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, against several doctors at the Correctional Training Facility, based on him allegedly receiving two years of negligent medical care. However, summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants in regard to Percelle’s Eighth Amendment claims on Sept. 23, 2009. He then filed suit in the Monterey County Superior Court on Jan. 4, 2010, again alleging medical negligence by prison doctors. Percelle claimed that he properly served the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the when the CDCR failed to respond, he moved for a default judgment against it. On June 23, 2010, a default judgment was entered against the CDCR, but not as to the individual prison doctors. Percelle claimed that his central file at the Correctional Training Facility contained information about the default judgment. On Dec. 8, 2010, the Monterey County Superior Court judge denied Percelle’s default judgment without prejudice due to a lack of expert evidence. As a result, a copy of the order was mailed to the Office of the Attorney General. That same day, an officer emailed a colleague, stating that they searched Percelle’s cell and alleged found two “points,” out of the three, required for gang validation. In early 2011, Percelle sought expert testimony regarding damages to pursue the entry of a default judgment against the CDCR, and on Aug. 30, 2011, the Superior Court appointed a new damages expert, who then wrote letters to the Correctional Training Facility requesting Percelle’s records and requesting to interview him. Less than a month later, on Sept. 27, 2011, officers allegedly obtained a third “point” against Percelle allegedly based on a confidential informant. Shortly thereafter, on Dec. 15, 2011, Percelle was “validated” as a member of a prison gang. He was then placed in the administrative segregation housing unit from Jan. 23, 2012 until his release on March 16, 2013. Percelle sued the assistant institutional gang investigators involved in deeming him to be a gang member, Officers Steven Pearson and Derek Arredondo, Sergeant Michael Williams, and Lieutenant Dylan Fletcher. Percelle alleged that the defendants violated his civil rights. Officers R. White, S. Maughmer, J. Jefferson and M. Brode were also initially named as defendants, but they were ultimately dismissed from the case. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the defendants’ actions commenced immediately following, and were motivated by, Percelle obtaining a default judgment against the individual defendants’ employer, the CDCR. Counsel contended that Percelle had no history of gang involvement, but that, nevertheless, Fletcher, Pearson, Arredondo and Williams conducted a pretextual “investigation” and gang “validation.” Plaintiff’s counsel contended that the gang validation package, which the defendants prepared, reviewed and/or signed, did not contain indicia of gang membership that complied with the requirements of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, such as § 3321, which details confidential material, and § 3378, which details security threat group identification, prevention, and management. In addition, counsel contended that the gang validation package did not comply with the CDCR’s Department Operations Manual, Article 22, which details gang management, or the CDCR’s Office of Correctional Gang Validation Manuals. Plaintiff’s counsel further contended that the defendants did not comply with the training they received pursuant to the settlement agreement in Castillo v. Alameda, where another prisoner challenged the constitutionality of the gang validation procedures. Thus, plaintiff’s counsel argued that the evidence used in Percelle’s individual validation did not indicate gang membership and that the defendants did not consider whether or not Percelle’s alleged validation was the result of retaliation by prison officials for Percelle’s jailhouse lawyering and peace proposal activities. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the subject gang validation package consisted of 11 pages in total and did not include the information that the defendants knew, which proved that Percelle was not a member of the Black Guerrilla Family prison gang. Counsel contended that once reviewed by the Office of Correctional Safety, the gang validation was, like all other gang validations, upheld by the Correctional Training Facility-Soledad Administrative Segregation Unit Institutional Classification Committee. As a result, plaintiff’s counsel contended that Percelle spent the duration of his determinate sentence in administrative segregation due to the pretextual circumstances. Defense counsel argued that the defendants’ actions were justified by the CDCR’s need to control prisons. Specifically, counsel contended that in November 2010, the Institutional Gang Investigation Unit at Correctional Training Facility received information that Percelle was participating in gang activity related to the Black Guerrilla Family. Thereafter, on Nov. 18, 2010, Pearson, Williams and Arredondo, searched Percelle’s cell, and confiscated his address book and a photocopy of a prison library book authored by George Jackson, an activist and cofounder of the Black Guerrilla Family. Defense counsel contended that the address book and the photocopy of the library book were designated as two “points,” out of the three, required for gang validation and that the information was documented in a confidential memorandum on Nov. 18, 2010. Defense counsel noted that on Dec. 8, 2010, Arredondo sent an email to a colleague, stating: “We hit Percelle and found two points, any information from [REDACTED] (Direct Link) would seal the deal.” Counsel contended that the redacted name was that of a confidential informant whose identification of Percelle as a gang member would later become the third point. Defense counsel also contended that on the same day, on Dec. 8, 2010, the Monterey County Superior Court judge denied Percelle’s default judgment without prejudice due to a lack of expert evidence, and mailed a copy of the order to the Office of the Attorney General. In early 2011, Percelle sought expert testimony regarding damages to pursue the entry of a default judgment against the CDCR, and on Aug. 30, 2011, the Superior Court appointed a new damages expert, who then wrote letters to the Correctional Training Facility requesting Percelle’s records and requesting to interview him. Less than a month later, on Sept. 27, 2011, the defendants allegedly documented, in a confidential memorandum, that they had obtained a third source item — identification by a confidential informant who was a validated Black Guerrilla Family member. Pearson and Arredondo then prepared a validation package. On Nov. 2, 2011, Brode and Jefferson at the Office of Correctional Safety received the validation package for additional review, and ultimately approved the package. Thus, Jefferson and Brode officially validated Percelle as a member of the Black Guerrilla Family prison gang on Dec. 15, 2011, and Percelle was placed in administrative segregation housing on Jan. 23, 2012. Defense counsel contended that, three days later, the Corrections Training Facility’s Institutional Classification Committee met to review Percelle’s gang validation, which it deemed warranted. Thereafter, Percelle was deemed to be a gang member and placed in the segregated housing unit. Thus, defense counsel argued that the defendants did not validate Percelle as a member of a prison gang, but that the CDCR Office of Correctional Safety did., Percelle alleged that his placement in the Segregated Housing Unit deprived him of normal human interaction. He also alleged that he could no longer earn good-time and work credits while in the Segregated Housing Unit, which caused him to be incarcerated for a longer period of time. Percelle claimed that as a result, he was diagnosed with anxiety and depression. Thus, he claimed that he suffers from psychological injuries, including agoraphobia, paranoia, claustrophobia, anxiety, depression, and insomnia, as a result of the defendants’ actions against him. Percelle received psychological treatment for his condition, and he has been recommended for further counseling and other treatment. As a result, he sought recovery of $78,000 in future medical costs for his psychological treatment, as well as sought recovery of punitive damages against each of the defendants.