In January 2008, plaintiff Philip Mounts, a white parole agent with the California Department of Corrections, interviewed for an assistant unit supervisor/Parole Agent II position within his same unit. The position consisted of monitoring sex offenders by means of GPS. Mounts had been a high-risk sex-offender agent for over seven years and had received special GPS training. He was one of the three final candidates for the position, but the decision was made to promote another parole agent, who was black, instead of Mounts or the other final applicant. The black candidate was from a general parole unit and had no high-risk sex-offender or GPS training. Mounts claimed that the parole agent was given preference due to his race and that Supervisor Judy Harris, who is also black, influenced the decision to promote the selected candidate. Mounts sued the state of California, the California Department of Corrections, and Harris. The state was voluntarily dismissed from the case and Harris was dismissed on summary judgment. Thus, the matter continued against the California Department of Corrections only. The case was initially tried in 2011, and the jury found that race was a factor in the promotional process. However, the jury also found that Mounts would not have received the promotion based upon other work-related issues and, thus, the trial resulted in a defense verdict. Mounts appealed, and during the appeal process, a Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris v. Santa Monica created a new standard for mixed-motive defenses. The appellate court determined that the new standard applied in Mounts’ case and it found that erroneous evidence had been admitted during the initial trial that could have mislead the jury. Thus, Mounts won his appeal, and the appellate court remanded the matter for a new trial. Plaintiff’s counsel noted that a decision regarding the promotion was made by the department’s interview panel composed of two individuals: one who is white and one is Hispanic. Their preferences then went to the main decision-maker, who is white. Harris was a deputy to the main decision-maker. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Harris influenced the decision not to choose Mounts for the position. Counsel contended that Mounts was more qualified than the black parole agent that obtained the position because the position was for monitoring sex offenders by means of GPS, which Mounts claimed he had a more extensive background in. Defense counsel contended that Harris simply forwarded the memo from the interview panel to the main decision-maker and that she was not involved in the final decision. Counsel also contended that the black parole agent was promoted instead of Mounts because the other parole agent had better management and interpersonal skills. Defense counsel further contended that Mounts had documented interpersonal problems and complaints mounted against him. However, plaintiff’s counsel claimed that during the trial Harris admitted that race was used as a factor in the promotional decision., Mounts initially claimed that he suffered emotional distress and lost wages as a result of being denied the promotion. However, prior to the first trial, Mounts was promoted to a Parole Agent III in the high-risk sex-offender’s unit and the black candidate was transferred out of the unit. Also, the original trial judge found no evidence of emotional distress damages. During the second trial, Mounts agreed to limit his emotional-distress damages to a 24-hour period and sought only one cent in non-economic damages. Mounts also sought recovery of less than $30,000 in economic damages. Defense counsel noted that due to his promotion, Mounts did not claim much in economic damages.